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                                 Abstract 
When the collective declines, who manages the collective-
owned land? When the socialist state fails, who possesses the 
state-owned river? This paper concerns the governance of 
land and natural resources that are still  owned by collectives 
or the state in rural China. No effective community 
governance has evolved in rural China to fill  the authority 
vacuum left by the People’s Commune system. As a result,  
such land and natural resources became real commons. I use 
the term “transitional commons” to indicate both the crucial 
influence of transitional political legal environment in their 
emergence and evolution and the transitional character 
inherent in their nature. Transitional commons are often in 
crisis: The tragedy of the commons occurs when the cost of 
exclusive use is too high. When the benefit  of exclusive use 
exceeds the cost,  contesting property claims arise over the 
common resources. I argue for an integrated approach to 
govern the transitional commons from the ground. Successful 
management of the transitional commons requires more than 
choosing the right property institution. A capable state and a 
well-functioning community are necessary to make the 
property institution, whichever it  is,  work. Rule of law is 
necessary to define the basic structure of a society and to 
guarantee the normal operation of the community self-
governance. Self-governance can increase social  capital for 
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When the collective declines, who manages the 
collective-owned land? When the socialist state fails,  who 
possesses the state-owned river? The weakness of the state 
and thinness of social capital in post-socialist countries have 
generated extensive discussion,1 but not in the scholarship of 
property rights and commons. Although the “external 
environment” has been singled out as an element in various 
models for governing the commons, specific study in this 
aspect is still  needed. The focus in existing literature has 
remained on the internal structure of the governance 
mechanism or the bundles of property rights.2 It  is still  
unclear how the external political legal environment impacts 
the emergence and evolution of the commons.3 This question 
is critical to the governance of natural resources in post-
socialist countries experiencing political and legal changes.     
                                                            
1  See ,  e.g . ,  BU I L D I N G  A TR U S T WO R T H Y  ST A T E  IN  PO S T-SOC I A L I S T  
TR A N S I T I O N  (Janos Kornai  & Susan Rose-Ackerman eds. ,  2004);  
CR E A T I N G  SO C I A L  TR U S T  IN  POS T-SO C I A L I S T  TR A N S I T I O N  (Janos Kornai  
e t  a l .  eds . ,  2004) .    
2  See ,  e.g . ,  EL I N O R  OS TR O M,  GO V E R N I N G  TH E  CO M M O N S:  TH E  
EV O L U T I O N  OF  IN S T I T U T I O N S  FO R  CO L L E C T I V E  AC T I O N  (1990);  
HE R N A N DO  DE  SO T O,  TH E  MY S T ER Y  OF  CAP I T A L:  WH Y  CA P I T A L I S M  
TR I M U P H S  IN  TH E  WES T  AN D  FA I L S  EV E R Y W H E R E  ELS E  153-206 (2000) ;  
Michael  A.  Heller ,  The Tragedy of  the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transi t ion from Marx to  Markets ,  111 HA R V.  L.  RE V.  621  (1998) ;  
Hanoch Dagan & Michael  A.  Heller ,  The  Liberal  Commons ,  110 YA L E  
L.J .  549 (2001).      
3  See Arun Agrawal ,  Sustainable Governance of  Common-Pool 
Resources:  Context ,  Methods,  and Poli t ics ,  32 AN N U.  RE V.  AN T H R OP O L.  
243,  250 (2003).  I  found only one paper  that  has  a  s imilar  topic  to  my 
research.  See Thomas Sikor ,  The Commons in Transi t ion:  Agrarian and 
Environmental  Change in Central  and Eastern  Europe ,  34  EN V T L.  






This paper concerns the governance of land and natural 
resources that are still  owned by collectives or the state in 
rural China.4 In the People’s Commune period, land in rural 
China was truly collectively owned and managed.5 After the 
People’s Commune system collapsed in the early 1980s, rural 
China is still  collectively owned in name, but each rural 
household has acquired use rights to a plot to live and several 
pieces of land to farm with the establishment of the 
Household Responsibility System (“HRS”).6 However, 
scholarship has long overlooked that substantial part of rural 
land and natural resources not distributed, and were supposed 
to be continually managed by the collectives or the state.  
Unfortunately no effective community governance has 
evolved in rural China to fill  the authority vacuum left by the 
People’s Commune system. As a result,  such land and natural 
resources became real commons. I  use the term “transitional 
commons” to indicate both the crucial influence of 
transitional political legal environment in their emergence 
and evolution, and the transitional character inherent in their 
nature. Transitional commons are often in crisis: The tragedy 
of the commons occurs when the cost of exclusive use is too 
high. When the benefit of exclusive use exceeds the cost, 
contesting property claims arise over the common resources. 
Different property claims prevail in different situations, 
resulting in temporal property arrangements. The temporary 
                                                            
4  The col lect ive usual ly refers  to  the vi l lage or  sub-vi l lage ent i ty.  See  
Loren Brandt e t  a l . ,  Land Rights  in  Rural  China:  Facts ,  Fict ions and 
Issues ,  CH I N A  J . ,  Jan.  2002,  a t  67,  73.    
5  For  more detai ls  about the col lect ive ownership under  the People’s  
Commune system,  p lease see  Greg O’Leary & Andrew Watson,  The Role 
of  the People’s  Commune in Rural  Development in  China ,  55 PAC.  AF F.  
593,  593 (1982).   
6  See ,  e.g . ,  Just in  Yifu Lin,  The Household Responsibi l i ty  System 
Reform in China:  A Peasant’s  Inst i tut ional Choice ,  69 AM.  J .  AGR I C.  






nature of property arrangements is further strengthened by the 
uncertain political and legal environment in which commons 
is embedded.  
I first  realized the existence of transitional commons in 
my exploration of the tragedy of the commons to Dianpai  
River, one of the numerous small rivers in rural Hubei of 
Central China, in the summer of 2008. There was tragedy of 
the commons to the river water resources. But to my surprise, 
different property claims arose to the land on both banks of 
the river. The three different destinies of the river water and 
the two riverbanks aroused my interest.  From then to the 
summer of 2010, I visited Dianpai  River again several times 
to investigate the reasons for their different destinies. This 
research is based on my fieldwork about Dianpai  River.  
In part I,  I  discuss in detail  how the governance of 
Dianpai  River collapsed when Chinese rural society 
experienced a great transformation. I discuss the evolution of 
property arrangements over the river in Part II  with an 
emphasis on the basis for different property rights claims. In 
Part III ,  I  develop a model for analyzing transitional 
commons, identifying the crucial factors that affect the rise 
and survival of property rights claims.  
In Part IV, I explore how to overcome the crisis of 
transitional commons. I argue for an integrated approach to 
govern the transitional commons from the ground. First,  
community distinctions mean that no external uniform 
resolution works for all  transitional commons. The effort to 
build an ideal property institution nationwide cannot avoid 
the tragedy of the transitional commons on the ground. A 
decentralized approach, with respect for institutional 
diversity, is essential to overcome the crisis of the 
transitional commons. Second, the successful management of 
the transitional commons requires more than choosing the 
right property institution. A capable state and a well-
functioning community are necessary to make the property 






rule of law for “order without law,” and building social 
capital through self-governance of the local community. Rule 
of law is necessary to define the basic structure of a society 
and to guarantee the normal operation of the community self-
governance. Self-governance can increase social capital for 
the local community to develop local consensus on property 
arrangements. The formal institutions are the foundation of 
the development of local rules.   
I .  COMMONS IN TRANSITION: AFTER 
COLLECTIVIZATION, ENDURING MARKETIZATION 
A. Traditional Governance:  
“Heaven is high and the emperor is far away” 
Before the establishment of the Communist regime, the 
state had never succeeded in directly controlling rural China. 
The distance between Chinese emperors and their subjects 
was characterized by the idiom “Heaven is high and the 
emperor is far away.” With this kind of gap between the 
rulers and the ruled, seemingly dictatorial rulers in fact ruled 
by allowing rural self-governance.7 With considerable 
autonomy from the state, the local community itself 
maintained internal order and settled disputes between its 
members.8    
In the pre-1949 period, Dianpai  River was not yet in 
existence. In Songzi County, Hubei Province of Central China, 
there were only several medium-sized irregularly-shaped 
lakes and Songzi River, a branch of the Yangtze River, which 
flowed alongside the lakes. Songzi River and the lakes were 
the main sources of drinking water and fish for villagers in 
the surrounding areas. The villagers lived mainly on farming, 
                                                            
7  FE I  XI A O T O N G,  FR O M  TH E  SO I L:  TH E  FO U N D A T I O N S  OF  CH I N E S E  
SO C I E T Y  113 (Gary G.  Hamil ton & Wang Zheng trans. ,  Universi ty  of  
Cal ifornia  Press  1992) .   






but fished in the lakes and the Songzi River occasionally. The 
simplicity of fishing instruments and the small population 
limited fishing to a sustainable level.  While land was 
privately owned, the lakes were kept as commons. There were 
no written rules on the use of lake water, the management of 
which depended on the authority of lineages and social norms 
based on villagers’ mutual familiarity.  
Before 1949, lineages were very developed in this area. 
Surviving lineage books, ruins of ancestral shrines and elders’ 
memories about lineages evidence the past existence of 
traditional authority in the area. Lineages and sub-lineages 
formed the basic divisions that managed administrative and 
other public activities of rural society.9 A complete lineage 
kept a book to record its members, had its own rules to 
regulate the behaviors of its members, and owned and 
operated ancestral shrines.  
Moreover, social norms based on mutual familiarity 
played an important role in regulating rural people’s behavior.  
The basic unit of Chinese rural society was the village, 
members of which could belong to one or more lineages. 
Residents in the same village constituted an “acquaintance 
society (shuren shehui),”10 a society based totally on 
familiarity, which developed from frequent and repeated 
interaction occurring over a long period of time.11 In an 
                                                            
9  See  PR A S E N J I T  DU AR A,  CU L T U R E,  PO W E R,  AN D  TH E  ST A T E:  RUR A L  
NO R T H  CH I N A,  1900-1942 87  (1988).   
1 0  See  Fei  Xiaotong,  supra  note  7 ,  a t  41.  “Acquaintance society” is  a  
more precise translat ion of  shuren shehui  than “society without 
s trangers .”  
1 1As Fei  Xiaotong said ,  Tradi t ional  rural  China was a  society where 
people  l ived from bir th  to  death in  the same place.  Every chi ld grew up 
in everyone else’s  eyes,  and in  the chi ld’s  eyes everyone and 
everything seemed ordinary and habi tual .  Life  in  tradi t ional  rural  
society was very parochial .  Vil lagers  restr ic ted the scope of  their  dai ly 






acquaintance society, formal laws play very limited roles. 
Instead, rites and customs defined what was acceptable and 
not acceptable in the villagers’ daily interactions.12 Because 
villagers lived and worked in the same village, any use of the 
water that may significantly reduce water quality would be 
censured by other villagers. For example, if a villager 
discharged a lot of waste into the lakes, other villagers would 
view him as “quede” (lacking morality). Informal social 
sanctions against a villager with a bad reputation would make 
his livelihood difficult.13 
B. Mao’s Collectivization: the Almighty Party-State   
Mao’s collectivization eliminated private property, and 
transformed traditional peasants into members of the People’s 
Commune.14 An important purpose of collectivization was to 
build a system in which the party-state was the sole exclusive 
                                                                                                                                                      
outs ide world;  they l ived sol i tary l ives;  they maintained their  own 
isolated social  c irc le.  See  Fei  Xiaotong,  supra  note  7,  a t  41.   
1 2  Id ,  a t  43.   
1 3  In  pr ivate  reta l ia t ion,  each individual  (or  family)  taci t ly promises  to  
reta l ia te  against  injury or  noncontr ibut ion to  publ ic  goods.  And a 
var iety of  informal  social  sanct ions may be made against  those who do 
not  contr ibute to  the col lect ive good: shaming,  gossip,  and r id icule ,  
accusat ions of  sorcery and witchcraf t ,  and ostracism and withdrawal  of  
reciprocal  a id .  See  Taylor ,  supra  note  8,  a t  82-89.  Daniel  Li t t le  actual ly  
gave a  very s imilar  example in  discussing th i  
s  point :  “members of  a  c losed community who consis tent ly pol lu te  the 
water  supply wil l  be detected,  and social  d isapprobat ion wil l  resul t .”  
DA N I E L  LI T T L E,  UN D ER S T A N D I N G  PE A S A N T  CH I N A  44  (1989).   
1 4  For  general  discussion about Mao’s  col lect iv izat ion,  see  YU  
J I AN R O N G,  YU E C U N  ZH E N G Z H I [PO L I T I C S  OF  YU E  VI L L A G E] 259-282 
(2001);  WU  YI,  CUN Z H I  BI A N Q I A N  Z H O N G  D E  QU A N W E I  Y U  ZH I X U 
[AU T H O R I T Y  AN D  OR D E R  IN  TH E  EV O L U T I O N  OF  VI L L A G E  GO V E R N AN C E] 






authority.15 Therefore successful collectivization must first  
destroy the socioeconomic and cultural basis of traditional 
authority, the lineage. The socialist  education movement of 
the same period portrayed the lineage as incompatible with 
communism and to be discarded.16 The state also deliberately 
mobilized the masses to destroy the symbols of the lineage, 
such as ancestral shrines.17 As a result,  the authority of 
lineage became severely curtailed, if not completely 
eliminated.  
Chairman Mao did not, however, succeed in replacing 
the traditional intimacy between villagers with socialist  
comradeship. Even in the People’s Commune period, social 
norms based on familiarity in traditional rural society played 
an important role in regulating villagers’ behaviors.18 One 
explanation is that the prohibition of free migration and 
elimination of market economy in the Maoist period 
strengthened rather than weakened the parochialism and 
closeness of Chinese rural society.      
In the 1950s, the Yonghe People’s Commune was 
established in what would later become Nanhai Township in 
Songzi County. Two brigades, Yongfu(“Y”) and Lajiadu 
(“L”), both operating under the aegis of the Yonghe People’s 
Commune,19 jointly governed the lakes that would later 
                                                            
1 5  Shen Yansheng,  Cunzheng de Xingshuai  yu  Chongjian  [The Decl ine 
and Reconstruct ion of  Vi l lage Governance ] ,  ZHANLUE YU GUANLI  
[STR A T E G Y  A N D  MA N A G E M E N T],  Dec.  1998,  a t  1 ,  11;  Wu Yi,  Id . ,  a t  95.   
1 6  See  Liang Zhiping,  Xiangtu Shehui zhong de Falv yu Zhixu  [Law and 
Order in  Rural  Society] ,  in  XI A N G T U  SH E H U I  DE  ZH I XU,  GO N G Z H E N G  YU  
QU A N W E I [OR D ER,  JU S T I C E  AN D  AU T H O R I T Y  IN  RUR A L  SO C I E T Y] 415,  
418 (Wang Mingming & Wang Sifu eds. ,  1997).   
1 7Id. ,  a t  418-9.   
1 8  Id . ,  a t  420.   
1 9  The people’s  commune consis ted of  three echelons:  the commune,  the 
product ion br igade and the product ion team. The reforms ini t ia ted in  






become Dianpai  River. Each brigade sent one member to 
guard these lakes. Large-scale private fishing was prohibited. 
Instead, the brigades organized fishing in the lakes at the end 
of every year and distributed the fish to all  the members.       
Dianpai  River was a fruit of the People’s Commune 
system. From the winter of 1978 to the spring of 1979, the 
Songzi County government organized the peasants to 
construct a pumping station and Dianpai river, which would 
connect the lakes with Songzi River so as to prevent the lakes 
from flooding the farmlands in the summer.20 Between the 
lakes and Songzi River are Y Village and L village, with 
Dianpai  River as a boundary in the middle. It  was not clear 
which entity should be responsible for the management of the 
river. When everything was publicly owned, any state agency 
appeared to have authority to stop villagers’ improper use of 
the river. Such agencies included the two brigades, which 
could regulate affairs within their own jurisdictions, the 
pumping station, which had authority to ensure that the river 
remained passable as a complementary canal,  and other 
agencies that had authority over other aspects of the river. 
The Brigade of Y village, for example, planted trees on the 
left  riverbank in the name of preventing soil erosion.   
                                                                                                                                                      
township  (xiang/zhen)  replaced the commune,  the v i l lage (cun)  replaced 
the br igade,  and the v i l lagers’  group (cunmin xiaozu)  replaced the 
product ion team.  See  e.g. ,  Peter  Ho,  Who Owns China’s  Land? Policies ,  
Property  Rights  and Deliberate  Inst i tu t ional Ambigui ty ,  166 CH I N A  
QU A R T.  394,  404-5 (2001).   
2 0  See  SH U I L I  JU  SH U L I  ZH I  BI A N X I E  ZU,  SO NG Z I  SH U I L I  ZH I  [HI S T O R Y  






C. Deng’s Marketization: Unorganized Homo Economicus 
The overreaching of the state in rural China proved to 
be costly, inefficient,  and unsustainable.21 In 1983, the 
Yonghe People’s Commune was dismantled, and the Nanhai 
Township was established. The brigades were dismantled, and 
Villagers’ Committees (VC) were organized.22 According to 
Chinese law, VC is a self-governance organization that 
                                                            
2 1  See  ZH A N G  LE T I A N,  GA O B I E  LI X I A N G:  RE N M I N  GO N G S H E  ZH I D U  
YA NJ I U  [FA R E W E L L  ID E A L:  ST U D Y  ON  PE O P L E’S  CO M M U N E]  415-46  
(1998).   
2 2  The ear l iest  v i l lagers’  commit tees  emerged in the Guangxi  
Autonomous Region in 1980.  Formed without the knowledge of  the 
local  authori t ies ,  these organizat ions were created by vi l lage elders ,  
former cadres  and community-minded vi l lagers .  The in tent ion was to  
address  a  decl ine in  social  order  and a  broader  pol i t ical  cr is is  as  
product ion br igades and teams s topped funct ioning at  the grass-roots  
level .  Within months,  local  off ic ials  had repor ted th is  development to  
the central  government.  The National  People’s  Congress  (NPC) leaders  
encouraged exper iments  with  th is  new form of  organizat ion.  In 1982,  
VCs were wri t ten in to the const i tu t ion as  e lected mass organizat ions of  
self-government (ar t ic le  111) .  See  China:  Vil lage Committee Elect ions:  
Firs t  Steps on a  Long March,  h t tp : / /aceproject .org/ace-
en/ topics/es/esy/esy_cn ( last  v is i ted  December  11,  2010).  For  the 
nat ionwide decommunizat ion,  p lease see ,  e.g. ,  Vivienne Shue,  The Fate 






manages the public affairs of the village.23 In contrast to the 
commanding relationship between the commune and the 
brigade in the People’s Commune era, the newly restored 
township, —the lowest governmental unit,  only guides the VC. 
VC is not a level of government and its members are not 
governmental officials. Unfortunately the self-governance of 
villagers was not well guaranteed. The party branch at the 
village level was granted power to “play the role of leading 
nucleus.” (fahui lingdao hexin zuoyong)24 Through the top-
down party system, the county and township government 
could intervene in and in most times actually exercise 
effective control over village affairs. The VCs, under the lead 
of the party branch, have essentially become an arm of the 
local government. At the same time, the local government 
provides almost no financial and human resources to VCs 
                                                            
2 3  Art icle  2 of  the Organic Law on the Vil lagers’  Committee of  
People’s  Republic  of  China (hereinaf ter  OLVC): “The vil lagers  
commit tee is  the pr imary mass organizat ion of  self-government,  in  
which the v i l lagers  manage their  own affairs ,  educate  themselves and 
serve their  own needs and in  which elect ion is  conducted,  decis ion 
adopted,  adminis tra t ion maintained and supervision exercised by 
democrat ic  means.  
The vi l lagers  committee shal l  manage the public  affairs  and public  
welfare  undertakings of  the v i l lage,  mediate  d isputes  among the 
vi l lagers ,  help maintain publ ic  order ,  and convey the v i l lagers’  
opinions and demands and make suggest ions to  the people’s  
government.”   
2 4  Art ic le  3 of  OLVC: “The pr imary organizat ion of  the Communist  
Par ty of  China in the countryside shal l  carry out  i ts  work in accordance 
with the Const i tu t ion of  the Communist  Par ty of  China,  p laying the ro le 
of  leading nucleus;  and,  in  accordance with the Const i tu t ion and laws,  
support  the vi l lagers  and ensure that they carry out  self-government 






because they are not a formal level of the bureaucratic system. 
As a result,  VC is an impotent hand.25 
Deng’s marketization reform proved to be much more 
successful than Mao’s People’s Commune in modernizing 
rural China. Marketization has transformed a closed rural 
society built  on the mutual-familiarity of villagers into an 
open society of significant mobility. Traditional connections 
based on mutual familiarity, while stil l  playing a role in the 
management of village affairs, have been greatly weakened 
by Deng’s marketization reform.26 Market forces have 
penetrated rural society and distanced people from traditional 
opinions and values, transforming many peasants into 
businessmen or migrant workers, who prefer business rules to 
rural customs.27 Material benefits frequently overcome 
familiarity in villagers’ relationships. Many villagers make 
their living in big cities as migrant workers, and only go back 
to their villages during the Chinese spring festival.  Thus the 
interactions and familiarity between villagers have greatly 
decreased. Business and migrant workers, who have taken on 
market values, care less about other villagers’ opinions than 
their forefathers, because such opinions are not as important 
                                                            
2 5  See  e.g. ,  Xiang J iquan,  Duanque caizheng xia de xiangcun zhengzhi 
fazhan: Jianlun zhongguo xiangcun minzhu de shengcheng tu j ing 
[Poli t ical  Development under the Financial  Shortage in  Rural  China:  A 
Ref lect ion on the Logic  of  Chinese Rural  Democrat izat ion ] ,  ZH O N G G U O  
NO N GC U N  GU A NC H A  [CH I N A  RUR A L  SU R V E Y],  June 2002,  a t  50.   
2 6  See  He Xuefeng,  Shichang Jingj i  x ia Nongmin Hezuo Nengli  de 
Tantao  [Peasants’  Abi l i ty  to  Cooperate under Market  Economy] ,  
TA N S U O  YU  ZH E N G M I N G[EXP L O R I N G  AN D  FR E E  VIEWS],  Sept .  2004,  a t  
18;  He Xuefeng & Liu Tao,  Zai Xiangtu Zhongguo yu Xiandai Zhongguo 
zhi j ian  [Between Rural  China and Modern China] ,  ZH O N G G U O  TU S H U  
PI N G L U N  [CH I N A  BO O K  RE V I E W],  Apri l  2009,  a t  79 ,  83.   
2 7  See ,  e .g . ,  YU N X I A N G  YA N,  PR I V A T E  LI E F  UND E R  SO C I A L I S M:  LO V E,  
IN T I M A C Y,  AN D  FA M I L Y  CH A N G E  IN  A CH I N E S E  VI L L A G E,  1949-1999 






to their survival. Such people are more likely to ignore other 
villagers’ interests in their use of the river.  For example, in 
olden times other villagers’ censure would effectively deter 
villagers who discharge waste into the river. Now those 
villagers who only stay in the village for one or two months 
every year simply do not care about such censure. They only 
care about how to find jobs in cities, or how to make more 
money through their hard work in urban factories,  to which 
the village community does not matter at all .  Thus the village 
community has very limited influence over these people with 
respect to the use of the common river.  
Neither Y village nor L village along the river is 
entirely free from the impact of marketization, although L 
village has experienced the impact much more significantly. 
A big rural market was next to L village and many villagers 
have been proprietors for a long time. L village has also 
exported migrant workers much earlier than Y village.  
D. State-Owned Commons  
The 1954 Chinese Constitution provided for state-
ownership of rivers. This provision has been kept despite 
frequent changes to the macro political and legal system in 
the early history of the People’s Republic of China.28 Even 
when the HRS replaced the People’s Commune in the 
management of rural land, ownership of rivers in rural China 
remained with the state. In the People’s Commune period, 
state-ownership of rivers could be exercised through the 
bureaucratic hierarchy of the People’s Communes. However, 
when the state retreated from the countryside, state-
ownership became much more an ideology than a real right to 
land. State-owned rivers became commons.   
                                                            
2 8  See  Ar t ic le  6 of  1954 Chinese Const i tu t ion,  Art ic le  6 of  1978 
Chinese Const i tu t ion,  Art ic le  9 of  1982 Chinese Const i tu t ion,  Art ic le  
81 of  Pr inciples  of  Civi l  Law of  People’s  Republic  of  China (1987) ,  






Theoretically state’s grassroots bureaucracy, including 
the county and township-level governments, can still  exercise 
the state’s ownership rights. I have found in my field study, 
that the Songzi (county-level) and Nanhai (township-level) 
governments are neither able nor willing to manage a small 
rural river such as Dianpai .  At the county level,  the Bureau 
of Water Administration (BWA), the Environment Protection 
Agency (EPA), and the Bureau of Agriculture (BOA) are the 
main agencies that have legal authority to regulate the use of 
the river. However, none of them takes their respective 
responsibilities to the river seriously. I first went to the BWA, 
where the officials told me that river management was an 
environmental issue and should be the responsibility of the 
EPA. Then I went to the EPA and was advised to query the 
BOA because it  was a rural river.  At the office of the BOA, 
the officials tried to help me contact the BWA.29  
At the township level,  I contacted the deputy head of 
the government responsible for water administration through 
personal connections, and he told me frankly that no 
management plan over small rural rivers ever existed. The 
most likely explanation is the lack of resources on the part of 
the township-level government. Within Nanhai Township, 
there are nine rivers of similar size, spreading over an area of 
171.3 square kilometers. There should be at least one head of 
the township government and five deputy heads, but when I 
went to the township office building on a business day, I 
could not find even one formal official to talk to. None of 
them was in office that day.      
                                                            
2 9  I  got  access  to  the county off ic ia ls  in  the three bureaus through 
personal  connect ions.  I  could see f rom my conversat ions with them that  
they were s incere in  communicat ing with  me.  The off ic ia ls  a lso looked 
up off icial  archives re levant to  the management  of  Dianpai  River  for  
me.  But  a l l  the documents  I  got  were dated back to  the construct ion of  







On the whole, when the state retreats from the 
countryside, its local regime is neither able nor willing to 
exercise state-ownership, turning the state-owned resources 
into commons. At the village level,  the traditional authority 
and connections that used to regulate villagers’ exploitation 
of common resources have declined due to the shocks of both 
the People’s Commune movement and the later marketization. 
The VCs have not been able to effectively manage the river 
due to lack of financial resources and authority among 
villagers. Real commons emerged in the post-socialist  
transition of rural China.   
II.  PROPERTY RIGHTS CLAIMS TO THE TRANSITIONAL 
COMMONS 
A. The Rise of Property Rights Claims 
The rise of property rights claims over the riverbank 
land was a classic Demsetzian process, triggered by the 
increase in its value.30 In the 1990s, after more than a decade 
of wealth accumulation, the villagers developed a trend of 
building new houses.31 The trees planted by Y Brigade in the 
name of preventing soil erosion suddenly became valuable as 
the need for timber rose. Most of the trees had died or 
withered due to lack of care, and the vacant riverbank land 
was open for cattle grazing. Some trees in front of villagers’ 
houses, however, got care from the villagers and grew up. 
When these villagers needed timber to build houses, they 
                                                            
3 0  According to Demsetz,  the emergence of  new proper ty r ights  takes 
place in  response to  the desires  of  the in teract ing persons for  
adjustment to  new benefi t-cost  possibi l i t ies .  See  Harold Demsetz,  
Toward a Theory of  Property  Rights ,  57 AM.  EC ON.  RE V.  347 (1967).   
3 1  Build ing a  new home is  widely recognized as  the most  important  






found no reason why they could not cut down riverbank trees 
planted just about ten meters from their doors. Such property 
rights claims to the trees were never especially asserted, but 
the villagers gave mutual recognition to each other’s claim. 
Every villager knew that the trees were planted by the village 
(brigade at that t ime) in the state-owned riverbank, but such 
knowledge did not prevent them from cutting down those 
trees. No villagers protested such exploitation. The VC could 
not and did not take any substantial actions to stop the 
exploitation of trees “belonged to the villagers collectively.”     
The villagers of Y did not make further use of the 
riverbank land until  the mid-1990s, when farming became 
very costly as agricultural taxes and fees on the farmland 
reached their peak.32 According to several villagers, their 
                                                            
3 2  VCs collected agr icul tural  taxes for  the government,  which were 
dis t r ibuted between the centra l  government and local  (province,  
prefecture,  county and township)  government.  VCs col lected fees  for  
their  normal  operat ion and to  provide publ ic  goods.  In  real i ty,  the 
government col lected  too much agr icul tural  taxes that  Chinese peasants  
could bear .  VCs were often not  able  to  col lect  enough money to pay the 
taxes to  the government,  not  mention the money needed for  providing 
public  goods.  Readers  might  wonder  how the taxes and fees could reach 
the peak when the s ta te  re treated in the post-Social is t  per iod.  The 
answer is  the s tate  shirked i ts  responsibi l i ty  to  provide public  goods,  
but  d id  not  give up exploi t ing resources from the peasants .  In  o ther  l i fe ,  
a l though the State  lost  i ts  abi l i ty  to  penetrate  in to v i l lagers’  dai ly l ife  
with the d ismantl ing the People’s  Communes,  i t  is  s t i l l  able  to  extract  
resources from the countryside.  The burden of  taxes and fees  aroused 
wide resis tance in  rural  China in  the mid-1990s.  For  more detai ls  about 
agr icul tural  tax burden and rural  resis tance in  China,  See ,  e.g. ,  Ray Yep,  
Can “Tax- for-Fee” Reform Reduce Rural  Tension in  China? The 
Process ,  Progress  and Limitat ions ,  177 CH I N A  QU A R T.  43 (2004);  Lu 
Xiaobo,  The Poli t ics  o f  Peasant Burden Reform in China,  25 J .  
PE A S A N T  ST U D.  113,  117-121 (1997);  See  a lso  Zhou Feizhou,  Cong Jiqu 






agricultural investment, including ferti l izer and agricultural 
tax and fees, often exceeded the farmland’s output during 
those years.33 Villagers had to find other ways to support 
themselves, and looked to the cultivation of the riverbank 
land. Although the riverbank land was not especially fertile,  
i t  was never counted as taxable land and thus more profitable 
to cultivate. Cultivation of the riverbank land increased 
gradually. At the beginning, only a few villagers planted 
some crops (including wheat, cotton, and rape, etc.)  randomly 
on the riverbank. After two or three seasons of impressive 
harvest without substantial interventions from the villagers’ 
committee or any other institutions, more and more villagers 
devoted time and money to cultivate the riverbank land. The 
villagers’ faith in their property rights over the riverbank 
land became stronger year after year through repeated use. 
Indeed, such faith even exceeded the villagers’ faith in their 
property rights over their farmland, because the farmland was 
subject to occasional redistribution.34  
                                                                                                                                                      
yu Nongmin Guanxi zhi  Yingxiang  [Rural Fee Reform and the Changing 
Relat ionship between State  and Peasant] ,  SH E H U I  XU E  YA N J I U  
[SO C I O L O G I C A L  ST U D I E S],  June 2006,  a t  1 .   
3 3  This  phenomenon was also repor ted in  o ther  provinces of  China.  See ,  
e.g. ,  Cao Zhoufeng,  Tudi heyi  b iancheng le  nongmin de fudan?  [Why 
has land become burden to  peasants?] ,  ZH O N G G U O  GA I G E  [CH I N A  
RE F OR M],  Nov.  2001,  a t  41.   
3 4  Such fai th  was highl ighted by several  v i l lagers  who chose their  own 
f ield in  the bank as  the tomb place for  the o ld of  their  famil ies .  From 
the middle 1990s unt i l  now, three of  f ive o ld people  in  Vil lage Y who 
passed away were bur ied in  the r iverbank f ie ld at  las t .  The tradi t ional  
Chinese cul ture emphasized to guarantee the dead ancestor’s  peace in 
land,  which means moving grave from one place to  another  would 
offend the ghost  of  the dead and br ing bad luck to  the l iv ing.  So the 
vi l lagers  are  very ser ious about  the locat ion of  tomb place and would 
def in i te ly prefer  to  bury the dead famil ies  in  their  own land.  In  addi t ion,  






Property rights claims that arose over the bank on the 
other side of the river differed from those recounted above, 
but the process was still  consistent with the Demsetz thesis. 
In the mid-1990s, there was also random cultivation of the 
land, but mostly by old and poor villagers. Their cultivation 
was not as continuous, extensive and successful as that in Y 
village. The riverbank land in L village could essentially be 
viewed as being open to all until  2000, when it  was grabbed 
by a local bully, Mr. H, for large-scale cash tree planting. Mr. 
H, well-known for his cruelty and talent in speculation, was a 
successful proprietor in the rural market next to L village. He 
had engaged in several different kinds of business, such as 
running restaurants and retailing chemical fertilizer. 
Stimulated by the booming timber market, he decided to 
invest in planting cash trees. The riverbank land was an 
excellent place to implement his plan. The legal basis of Mr. 
H’s possession of the land was dubious, but his use of the 
land provoked no objection from the township government or 
the VC. By 2008, the saplings he had planted had already 
grown into big trees. The success of Mr. H’s investment was 
unquestionable. Some villagers viewed it  as an illegal 
occupation of state-owned land, but they did nothing other 
than complaining casually.   
The exploitation of the land on both sides of the river 
generated significant economic gains, which caught the 
attention of the state-owned pumping station. The station 
asserted its ownership over the whole riverbank land by 
arguing that the river had been designed as a complementary 
canal to the pumping station. However, the station did not 
                                                                                                                                                      
convenient  to  offer  sacr if ices  to  ancestors  dur ing fest ivals ,  which is  
of ten carr ied out  before ancestors’  tomb.  So,  the tombs on the r iverbank 
f ie ld  can be viewed as a  symbol of  pr ivate  proper ty.  I t  means that ,  in  
the mind of  the v i l lagers  the ownership  of  the r iverbank f ield belongs 
to  them forever ,  just  as  that  of  the bones of  the ancestors  who has been 






take substantial actions to realize its assertion, and only a 
small portion necessary for the normal operation of pumping 
machines fell  into its control.   
In the following, I will  discuss the bases of the above 
property rights claims in detail.  In addition, the absence of 
property rights claims over the river water resources will  be 
briefly described.   
B. Egalitarianism  
Egalitarianism is a tenet of traditional Chinese agrarian 
morality. According to Confucius, a nation or a family needs 
not worry about scarcity, but does need to worry about 
unequal distribution.35 The concept of egalitarianism 
continued to influence Chinese behaviors. In the Maoist 
period, the Communist Party aimed to eliminate inequality in 
China, which obviously strengthened Chinese belief in 
egalitarianism. Although Deng’s reform encouraged “a small 
portion of people to become wealthy first,” egalitarianism 
still  has substantial moral weight in Chinese society, to 
different degrees in different places and situations. In rural 
society, despite the fact that the traditional authority and 
custom have been greatly weakened by both Communism and 
the Marketization, egalitarianism still  significantly affects 
villagers’ behaviors. For example, He Xuefeng found in his 
field studies peasants care much more about their relative 
situation to others than their absolute situation.36   
The emergence of property rights in Y village 
demonstrates the dominance of egalitarianism.37 Villagers 
                                                            
3 5  TH E  AN A L E C T S  OF  CO N F UC I U S  115 (Burton Watson trans. ,  Columbia 
Universi ty  Press  2007) .     
3 6  HE  XU E F E N G,  SH E N M E  NO N GC U N,  SH E N M E N  WE N T I  [WH A T  I S  
CO U N TR Y S I D E,  A N D  WH A T  I S  IT S  PR O B L E M] 172-6 (2008).   
3 7  An example I  got  in  the f ie ld s tudy can i l lustrate  such logic  of  
vi l lagers’  behaviors .  There was an  unsuccessful  effor t  of  the v i l lagers’  






generally think that “nobody should enjoy more than me” 
when it  comes to the use of common resources. The 
distribution of the riverbank land in Y village has conformed 
to egalitarianism. Although no authority or written rules 
regulated the rise of property rights claims to the vacant 
riverbank land, there were no serious disputes or conflicts 
among villagers in the whole process. Each household got the 
exclusive right to the land in front of their home. For lands to 
which no household was adjacent,  each household got a piece 
in equal size.    
C. “Might Makes Rights”  
According to Umbeck, all  private ownership rights are 
ultimately founded upon the ability to forcefully exclude 
potential competitors. Force, not fairness, determines the 
distribution of wealth in a society.38 Umbeck’s hypothesis 
                                                                                                                                                      
had been that  each household should share equal ly the cost  of  
construct ion and operat ion of  that  system. All  the v i l lagers  would have 
benefi ted a  lo t  f rom such a  system i f  successful ly bui l t .  Most  v i l lagers  
had made the in i t ia l  payment.  However ,  th is  system fai led f inal ly 
because the major i ty was frustrated by a  few who did  not  pay.  They fel t  
i t  was unequal  and refused to  pay the remaining sum.  The f inal  resul t  
was that  many households bui l t  their  own system to get  c lean 
underground water  for  dr inking,  the to tal  cost  of  which went far  beyond 
that  of  a  publ ic  water  supply system.  
3 8  John Umbeck,  Might Makes Rights:  A Theory of  the Formation and 
Ini t ia l  Distr ibut ion of  Property  Rights ,  19 EC O N.  IN Q U I R Y 38,  57 (1981).  
Zerbe and Anderson hold a  d if ferent  v iew and emphasize that  cul tural  
concepts  of  fa irness served to create proper ty norms and inst i tu t ions.  
See  Richard  O.  Zerbe Jr .  & C.  Leigh Anderson,  Culture and Fairness  in  
the Development o f  Inst i tu t ions in  the Cali fornia Gold  Fields ,  61  J .  
EC O N.  HI S T.  114 (2001).  In  the fo l lowing par t  of  th is  paper ,  I  explain 
the d ifferences of  property arrangements  in Y and L vi l lages.  One 
reason is  the d ifference in  cul tural  norms,  which might prefer  fa irness  






seems inconsistent with the egalitarian distribution of 
riverbank land in Y village, but finds ample support in what 
happened to the riverbank land in L village.  
Mr. H, a villager of L and also a proprietor, had a well-
known reputation as a bully for his brutality. He believed in 
the power of violence and never hesitated to use it  when 
necessary to pursue what he viewed as justice.39 His father 
was a chief cook of the People’s Commune government and 
had extensive connections with local officials.  He was also a 
long-term leader of an informal gang of jobless young people, 
the major business of which is to “get rid of trouble for 
people”.40 His restaurant was one of the best in the local 
market and a popular destination of L village’s VC members. 
His grabbing of the riverbank land faced no intervention from 
the VC.  
According to Mr. H, he signed a contract with the VC 
to use the riverbank land for ten years. For the three-mile-
long strip, the contract fee is 2000 RMB per year.41 The gross 
income of growing crop trees on the land, according to the 
calculations of Mr. H, will be more than 600, 000 RMB at the 
end of the contract term.42 It was unreasonable for the VC to 
charge so little for a business of great profit .  Mr. H’s 
explanation was that this investment was his idea and helped 
get rid of the VC’s trouble of how to effectively manage the 
riverbank. Only Mr. H, a man with credible private violence, 
could exercise effective management of the riverbank. There 
was also a wide-spread rumor that he bribed the VC members 
to get their acquiescence. Whether a contract existed or not, 
                                                            
3 9  Interview with Mr.  H,  in  L vi l lage,  Nanhai Township,  Songzi County,  
Hubei,  China (Aug.  21,  2010).   
4 0  Id.  
4 1  I  was not  able  to  see the contract  in  my two-day-vis i t  to  the v i l lage 
in  the summer of  2010.  But Mr.  H promised to show i t  to  me next t ime I  
went there.   






Mr. H’s might in the local community was the key to his 
successful exclusive use of the riverbank land of L village. 
Other villagers were unable to unite together to resist  his 
exclusive possession. His wealth and brutality deterred 
potential dissenters.    
Mr. H would be able to reap a big profit  from his wise 
investment. His exclusive possession for ten years, despite its 
suspicious origin, strengthened his claim to the land. Mr. H’s 
might seems to make rights for him. However, the principle 
that might makes rights is far from accepted in Chinese 
society. Might-based rights, although very prevalent in China, 
are still  in the gray zone of legitimacy.  
Like Mr. H, people with might often try to justify their 
rights by claiming efficiency.43 It is true that private 
exclusive use is often much more efficient than the former 
state-ownership. This justification, however, has not been 
widely accepted by the Chinese populace for various 
reasons.44 Mr. H’s might-based rights can exist only as long 
as he can forcefully exclude those who do not agree.       
D. Historical Connections  
The Communist past is an inescapable inheritance of 
the transitional commons. Historical connections established 
in the Communist period can also be a basis of property 
rights claims.45 Here the pumping station had such 
                                                            
4 3  See ,  e.g . ,  Andrew Sheng,  Geng Xiao & Yuan Wang,  Property  Rights  
and ‘Original  S in’  in  China:  Transact ion Costs ,  Wealth  Creat ion,  and 
Property  Rights  In frastructure ,  in  PO L I C Y  RE F O R M  AN D  CH I N E S E  
MAR K E T S:  PR OG R E S S  AN D  CH A L L E N G E S  97 (Bel ton M.  Fleisher  Eds. ,  
2008).    
4 4  Id.   
4 5  In  Russia ,  a  wide var iety of  s ta te  and quasi-s ta te  organizat ions were 
the main actors  in  the pr ivat izat ion process  and claimed proper ty r ights  







historically based claims. The station justified its claim by 
recalling that the river was built  as a complementary canal to 
the pumping station in the People’s Commune period. The 
fruits of the people’s labor should be managed by the state-
owned pumping station. Due to its limited ability to realize 
its rights claim, the pumping station ultimately only 
controlled a small part  of the adjacent riverbank land.  
Although the pumping station did not succeed, 
historical connections could be a strong basis of property 
rights. Transitional commons were state-owned in the 
Communist period. Their creation and operation as part of the 
planning economy often involved the efforts of more entities 
and people than now. In other words, they were “fruits of the 
people’s collective effort.” Any private property rights claim 
to them can be easily labeled as stealing the people’s wealth. 
In contrast,  the claims by governmental entities, such as state 
agencies and state-owned enterprises, seem to be 
ideologically sound. In a state like China, where the socialist  
ideological orthodoxy has not been completely discarded, 
historical connections also have some limited moral strength. 
In addition, governmental entities that claim rights to these 
transitional commons often had prior connections with them, 
which increase the credibility of their claims.  
However, the governmental entities are not working to 
benefit  the public or the state, but instead to promote their 
own separate interests.46 For example, the pumping station, 
although still  state-owned, had to provide on its own the 
salary and benefits of its employees. It  charged for its 
pumping services. Its rights claim to the riverbank land was 
not actually for better management and operation of the river 
and the pumping station, as asserted, but rather to seize 
potential benefits from the cultivation of the riverbank land. 
                                                            
4 6  See ,  e.g . ,  Wong K K & Zhao X B,  The Inf luence of  Bureaucrat ic  
Behavior on Land Apport ionment in  China:  The Informal Process ,  17 






In my interview with the manager of the pumping station, he 
did not even try to disguise this real intention. As he said, the 
villagers had no right to possess the riverbank land, and all  
the uses of the riverbank land should be authorized by the 
pumping station. The alleged authorization power was just a 
pretext for charging the villagers.       
E. Tragedy of the Commons  
In contrast to the various property rights claims to the 
riverbank land, no similar claims arose regarding the use of 
the river water and the fish resources. A classic tragedy of 
the commons took place.  
With no public garbage-disposal facilities in the area, 
the river water became a dumping ground for villagers to 
discharge production and household wastes. Everyone could 
discharge waste into the river and the cost of deterioration 
was shared by all .  A rational villager found that his share of 
the loss of discharging waste into the river was less than the 
cost of purifying his waste before releasing it .  Because 
everyone would have the same cost-benefit  calculation, the 
villagers were locked into a system of “fouling their own 
nest.”47 The river water, as a result,  was seriously polluted.  
For the same reason that the river water was polluted, 
fish resources were exhausted due to overfishing. The 
villagers fell into a vicious competition to fish, using 
destructive fishing instruments.48   
                                                            
4 7  Garret t  Hardin,  The Tragedy of  the Commons ,  162 SC I E N C E 1244,  
1245 (1968) .  
48  Villagers  spread the f ishing net  f rom one s ide of  the r iver  to  the 
other ,  and as  a  resul t ,  any f ish of  s ignif icant  s ize swimming along that  
par t  of  the r iver  cannot  escape.  In the three-mile- long r iver ,  there were 






The diagram below is a visual representation of the 




III.  A MODEL FOR ANALYZING TRANSITIONAL 
COMMONS 
In this section I explore the reasons for the different 
destinies of the river water and the two riverbanks. Drawing 
                                                            
49  Google Map of  th is  small  area in  rural  China is  unavai lable .  In  my 
vis i ts  to  Songzi County,  I  fa i led to  f ind a  map that  could show the r iver  






upon existing models,50 I  classify variables that affect the 
governance of commons into four categories: (i) the 
characteristics of the common resources, (ii)  the community 
and the people that exploit the resources; (ii i)  the relationship 
between common resources and human exploiters;  and (iv) 
the external political and legal environment to which the 
human exploiters are subject.  Transitional commons are 
distinct from other kinds of commons because of the 
disintegrated local communities that govern them and the 
changing external polit ical legal environment to which they 
are subject. I shall next describe the variables in my model in 
relation to their application to the Dianpai  river system.      
A. Characteristics of the Common Resources 
Resource characteristics, such as size, mobility, 
divisibility, and their potential  uses, determine the potential 
                                                            
5 0  Different  models  of  explor ing the inst i tu t ional  arrangements  over  
common resources have been developed,  which ident ify a  ser ies  of  
var iables that  inf luence the success  or  fa i lure  of  common resource 
management .  However ,  as  Agrawal has pointed out ,  scholars  of  
commons have discovered far  more var iables  that  potential ly affect  
resource management  than is  possib le to analyze careful ly.  Agrawal’s  
review of  the three most  careful  s tudies  of  the commons found that  
Wade,  Ostrom, and Baland & Platteau jo intly ident ify 36 important  
var iables re levant  to  the successful  management of  common resources.  
I f  one el iminates the common var iables across the three s tudies,  24 
different  var iables  s t i l l  remain.  Fur ther ,  because the effects  of  some 
var iables  may depend on the s tate  of  other  var iables ,  any careful  
analysis  of  the commons needs to  incorporate  interact ion effects  among 
var iables .  As a  resul t ,  scholars  confront  t remendous analyt ical  
problems in  using their  models .  See  Agrawal ,  supra  note  3 ;  Ostrom,  
supra  note  2;  JE A N-MA R I E  BA L A N D  & JE A N-PH I L I P P E  PL A T T E A U,  
HA L T I N G  DE G R A D A T I O N  OF  NA T UR A L  RE S O UR C E S:  IS  TH E R E  A RO L E  FO R  
RUR A L  CO M M U N I T I E S?  (1996);  ROB E R T  WA D E,  VI L L A G E  RE P UB L I C S:  






exploitative methods, and place inherent constraints on their 
management. Previous empirical studies of commons always 
concentrate on a single resource, such as forestry, water, 
fishery, or lobster.51 My study, on the other hand, 
comprehensively explores an entire river resource system, 
which includes water, fish, and riverbank land, thus allowing 
me to measure how the resource characteristics variable 
affects resource management. The opposite outcomes of the 
riverbank land and the river resources are testaments to the 
importance of resource characteristics in governing the 
commons.  
First, resource characteristics affect the costs and 
benefits of the exclusive use of that resource. If the cost of 
exclusion is high and the benefit is trivial,  the probability of 
developing exclusive property claims will be low, and the 
probability of a tragedy of the commons will  be high. If the 
cost of exclusion is low and benefit  is substantial,  the 
opportunity for profit will drive exploiters to find ways of 
exclusive use. In the Dianpai  river case, the cost of exclusive 
use of land is much lower than that of water or fish. The 
riverbank land can be easily divided into small pieces with 
boundaries clearly defined.52 A villager can easily detect 
                                                            
5 1  See  e.g. ,  Ostrom,  supra  note  2 ,  58-87,  143-81; JA M E S  M.  AC H ES O N,  
CA P T UR I N G  TH E  CO M M O N S:  DE V I S I N G  IN S T I T U T I O N S  TO  MA N A G E  TH E  
MA I N E  LO B S T E R  IN D US T R Y  (2003) .   
5 2  Informal  fences,  such as a  t ree  and even jus t  several  s tones ,  def ine 
the boundar ies  between plots .  For  outs iders  they do not  necessar i ly 
know the boundar ies  between different  p lo ts ,  but  do know clear ly the 
boundary between public  land and crop plots  by seeing the crops 
planted.  No complicated  fences of  (barbed or  smooth)  wire  are needed 
because the number of  b ig l ives tock in  wild is  very l imited.  The 
si tuat ion is  different  from the American west  in  the wri t ing of  
Anderson and Hil l .  See  Terry L.  Anderson & Peter  J .  Hil l ,  The 
Evolut ion of  Property  Rights :  A Study of  the American West ,  18 J .  L.  & 






trespasses to his land. In contrast,  i t  is difficult to achieve 
exclusive use of a part of a three-mile-long river. The only 
feasible way seems to be to gain control over the whole three-
mile-long river. The cost of monitoring and defending the 
exclusive use will be very high, because it  is much more 
difficult to detect and prevent fishing and discarding wastes 
into the river than to stop others from squatting on the 
riverbank land.53 The benefit  of exclusive use of land is also 
much higher than that of water or fish. Land is the basic need 
for peasants,  who rely almost entirely on land to make a 
living. The dense populations in the villages along the river 
make land a scarce resource. Fish, on the other hand, is just a 
luxury item for most villagers. Only several villagers make 
their living by fishing. In a rainy area full  of lakes, water is 
much less valuable than land.   
Second, resource characteristics affect the exploiters’ 
evaluation of the risk of exhaustion. The deterioration of 
water and extinction of fish took place gradually. Any single 
instance of fishing or discarding wastes into the water did not 
bring significant and immediate damage to the river, but the 
accumulation of such behaviors would unavoidably lead to 
the destruction of the river water resources. The tragedy is 
not just the result  of a collective action problem involving the 
villagers’ inability to cooperate effectively, but also a 
consequence of the limited rationality of human beings, 
which tends to value immediate gains much more than losses 
in the far future and ignore the latter.54 The possibility of 
                                                            
5 3  Development of  technology might reduce the prohibi t ively high cost  
of  exclusive use at t r ibuted to  resource character is t ics .  See  Anderson & 
Hil l ,  Id .   
5 4  “A person is  apt  to regard a marginal  change as more momentous 
when the change occurs  around a reference point  than away f rom i t .”  
Robert  El l ickson,  Bringing Culture and Human Frai l ty  to  Rat ional 
Actors:  A Cri t ique of  Classical  Law and Economics ,  65 CH I. -  KE N T  L.  






resource depletion in the future is not enough to encourage 
villagers to change their behaviors and establish either 
effective collective management or private individual rights 
over the river.55 From the villagers’ perspective, inaction or 
maintaining the status quo is the best choice until  the 
resources are completely destroyed. In contrast,  a plot of land 
cannot be cultivated by many villagers at the same time. A 
villager must either grab a plot or lose it .  The welfare effect 
of such a choice is significant. Inaction means that he will  
lose the plot. A villager therefore has strong incentives to 
claim his rights over the land, through either might or 
consensus with other villagers. Short-sightedness of human 
beings is always a factor, but its negative impact is much 
more significant in the exploitation of resources that 
deteriorate gradually.                                 
B. Community and the People that Exploit the Resources     
One of the biggest accomplishments of the scholarship 
on commons is to successfully shift  the research focus of 
overcoming the tragedy of the commons from the choice 
between the leviathan and the market to the self-governance 
of the local community.56 There has been abundant research 
on communal governance of common resources.57 However, 
                                                            
5 5  Short-s ightedness  is  a  symbol of  bounded wil lpower.  See  Chr is t ine 
Jol ls ,  Cass R.  Sunstein & Richard Thaler ,  A Behavioral  Approach to  
Law and Economics ,  50 ST A N.  L.  RE V.  1471,  1479 (1998) ;  Richard 
Posner ,  Rational Choice,  Behavioral  Economics,  and the Law ,  50  ST A N.  
L.  RE V.  1551,  1555 (1998).   
5 6  See  Ostrom, supra  note  2.   
5 7  See  e.g . ,  NA T I O N A L  RE S E AR C H  CO U NC I L,  TH E  DR A M A  OF  CO M M O N S  
(2001);  JE A N-MA R I E  BA L A N D  & JE A N-PH I L I P P E  PL A T T E A U,  HA L T I N G  
DE G R A D A T I O N  OF  NA T U R A L  RE S O U R C E S:  IS  TH E R E  A RO L E  FO R  RUR A L  
CO M M U N I T I E S?  (1996);  ROB E R T  WA D E,  VI L L A G E  RE P UB L I C S:  EC O N O M I C  
CO N D I T I O N S  FO R  CO L L E C T I V E  AC T I O N  IN  SO U T H  IN D I A  (1994);  Ostrom, 






existing empirical studies often assume that, the communities 
are well-structured and have well-functioning institutions, 
clear community rules, or at least explicit  social norms 
regarding the management of the commons. What scholars 
have to investigate in these cases is simply whether the 
institutions, rules or norms function effectively or why they 
do not function effectively. The local communities 
surrounding the Dianpai  River, however, are communities 
without any well-functioning institutions or explicit norms 
regarding the river. To understand how property rights claims 
arose and survived in such communities, we need to 
investigate the communities’ internal power structures, 
population composition, and value preferences.  
The rise and survival of a property claim depend 
largely on the position of the claimer within the power 
structure of that local community. This position is critical to 
the claimer’s ability to and cost and benefit of making 
exclusive use of the common resources.58 The difference in 
property arrangements over the two riverbank lands is a good 
illustration. The overwhelming private power of Mr. H plays 
an important role in the exclusive use of the riverbank land of 
L village. Mr. H is a very distinct figure in the community of 
L village, with no analog in the community of Y village. Mr. 
H is a hybrid of entrepreneur and bully.59 Only Mr. H has 
                                                            
5 8  See  Demsetz,  supra  note  30.   
5 9  He is  s trong,  smart ,  and very sensi t ive to  social  and pol i t ical  change.  
Unlike ordinary vi l lagers ,  he tr ies  different  businesses and travels  
around,  never  hesi ta t ing to  take a  profi t  oppor tuni ty.  He bel ieves in  the 
power of  weal th and violence ra ther  than law and rules .  He keeps good 
rela t ions with v i l lagers’  committee members  and local  government 
off ic ia ls .  He has been in ja i l  before ,  which actual ly s t rengthens his  
inf luence in  the gangs.  He frequent ly resor ts  to  violence,  but  never  
abuses  i t ,  in  his  words,  “not  v iolat ing the common sense of  the local  
community.”  He real ized the prof i tabi l i ty of  p lant ing crop trees  on the 






both the intelligence and the power to cultivate the riverbank 
land exclusively. Without him, the riverbank land on the side 
of L village would have been kept as a commons or randomly 
cultivated by the peasants.  Mr. H’s unique position in the 
local power structure decides the property arrangement over 
the riverbank land of L village. No individuals in Y village 
could mobilize resources like Mr. H has done to exclude all 
other villagers from using the riverbank land on the side of Y 
village.   
The different population compositions and value 
preferences of the two villages also contributed to the 
different property arrangements. The impact of marketization 
was much more significant in L village than in Y village.60 
More L villagers were proprietors and migrant workers, 
whose behaviors were likely closer to those of a homo 
economicus. These more rational villagers preferred 
efficiency to equality and might have more sympathy with Mr. 
H’s efficiency justification than the villagers of Y. Their 
emergence as a group also increased the heterogeneity of the 
village community. Wealth and power were more 
concentrated than in Y village. Greater mobility brought by 
migrant workers further weakened the coherence of the 
village, increasing the cost of collective action.61 Under such 
circumstances, Mr. H successfully claimed the whole 
riverbank land in L village without suffering substantial 
objection. In contrast,  the wealth and power in Y village were 
still  broadly and equally distributed. The traditional value of 
egalitarianism was relatively influential . As a result ,  mutual 
recognition of claims to equal possession was the most 
efficient resolution for Y villagers. Mr. H’s doctrine of 
“might makes rights” would encounter much more resistance 
                                                            
6 0  See  Par t  IC of  th is  paper ,  a t  10 .    
6 1For  impact  of  mobil i ty on community coherence,  see  RO B E R T  D.  
PU T N A M,  BO W L I N G  AL O N E:  TH E  CO L L A P S E  AN D  RE V I V A L  OF  AM E R IC A N  






in Y village than in L village because the egalitarianism had 
much more moral weight in Y village.  
C. Relationship between Common Resources and Human 
Exploiters   
The relationship between transitional commons and 
human exploiters include both physical and socioeconomic 
aspects. The physical relationship between transitional 
commons and potential users, such as their geographical 
relationship, is an important factor in deciding the cost of 
exclusive use of the common resources. The socioeconomic 
relationship, such as the socioeconomic value of the 
transitional commons to potential users, decides the 
incentives for exclusive use.      
The different geographical relationships between the 
river and potential users in the two villages can explain the 
different property claims to the two riverbanks. The distances 
of the villagers’ homes to the riverbanks differ: in Y village, 
the distance is only several paces; in L village, it  is about 800 
meters.  Moreover, the Y villagers’ houses and distributed 
farmland are lined up parallel to the riverbank; the L 
villagers’ houses are spread out randomly. Such differences 
mean that the cost of defining and defending claims to the 
riverbank land is much higher in L village than in Y village.   
With the proximity of Y villagers’ homes and farmland 
with the riverbank, Y villagers’ daily activities around their 
houses and distributed plots naturally extended to the 
riverbank, through which they got water for irrigation and 
drinking. Villagers established a closer relationship with the 
specific part of riverbank land neighboring their houses or 
distributed land. This natural connection was mutually 
recognized among villagers and provided a convenient and 
easy blueprint by which property rights could be recognized. 
Generally peasants in Y village got the plot of the riverbank 
land adjacent to their houses or distributed farmland. The Y 






facilitated the monitoring of and effective deterrence to 
potential violators. Any other property arrangements 
inconsistent with such natural connections would incur great 
monitoring cost.  Mr. H did not take over the riverbank land in 
Y village. The difficulty in monitoring and stopping 
neighboring villagers’ trespass was one reason. According to 
Mr. H, “it’s unreasonable to stop people loitering around 
their houses or going through the bank land to the river.”62 
In contrast,  there was no such connection between the 
riverbank and villagers in L village. As a result ,  it  was much 
more costly for the villagers to define any claimed rights to a 
plot of riverbank land. A L villager would incur extra time 
and energy in monitoring potential violators. The higher cost 
of exclusive use of the riverbank land in L village could only 
be overcome through economies of scale. That was partly why 
Mr. H succeeded in seizing the whole riverbank land for 
planting cash trees. Fragmentary cultivation of part of the 
riverbank land in L village could not generate enough profits 
to offset the relatively higher cost of defining and protecting 
the claimed property rights. Mr. H’s investment in the 
riverbank land not only reduced the cost  of exclusive use per 
unit,  but also generated more profits to offset the cost.    
 Another reason for the different property arrangements 
over the two riverbanks is the different socioeconomic value 
of the riverbank land to villagers in the two villages. As 
introduced above, L village underwent more extensive and 
deeper marketization and had larger population of proprietors 
and migrant workers, who made their living mainly from non-
                                                            
6 2  Interview with Mr.  H,  supra  note  39.  According to  El l ickson,  “A key 
advantage of  individual  land ownership  is  that  detect ing the presence of  
a  trespasser  is  much less  demanding than evaluat ing the conduct of  a  
person who is  pr iv i leged to  be where he is .”  But in  the  case of  easement,  
i t  would a lso be dif f icul t  to  detect  whether  a  person has overs tepped 
the boundary of  h is  easement.  See  Robert  El l ickson,  Property  in  Land ,  






agricultural activities. The riverbank land was much less 
important to them than to ordinary peasants. As a result ,  Mr. 
H’s exclusive use of the whole riverbank in L village 
encountered much weaker resistance than if it  would have in 
Y village.63   
The land’s relatively lower socioeconomic value to the 
pumping station also explains i ts reluctance to take any 
substantial action to realize its property rights claim to the 
riverbanks. Not only had it  not claimed property rights to the 
riverbanks before the villagers’ cultivation, even after,  the 
value created was still  too limited to prompt substantial 
action from a state-owned entity like the pumping station.     
D. External Political and Legal Environment  
The transitional commons is a product of the changing 
external political and legal environment. The sensitivity to 
the external environment can be easily discerned in the 
management of transitional commons. Transitional states are 
often still  struggling for a balance between the market and 
the state. The political and legal system is still  in an 
experimental stage. The property regime has not been 
solidified. Mutually contradictory principles direct the 
transitional process, depending on the specific time and 
situation. The macro external environment constitutes the 
context of the drama of the commons, and defines the 
possibilities of property claims that can arise from the 
commons. Any changes in the external environment would 
affect the decisions of resource exploiters.  
                                                            
6 3  This  is  d ifferent  from Demsetz’s  example,  in which pr ivate proper ty 
r ights  emerged in response to  the  ra ised fur  value caused by the 
European fur  t rade.  In h is  case ,  fur  was equally valuable  to  a l l  Indians.  
In  my case,  the lower evaluat ion of  the land by the major i ty of  L 
vi l lage reduced Mr.  H’s cost  of  excluding them and promoted the 






In the case at hand, China’s gradual reform has 
undergone a tortuous process. The market economy was only 
officially recognized as such in 1993, nearly fifteen years 
after the initiation of the 1978 reforms. One year later,  the 
standing committee of the People’s Congress incorporated the 
making of a property law into its legislative plan. It  was not 
until  2004 that the Constitution was amended to guarantee 
respect for private property.6 4  The new Chinese Property Law 
came into effect in 2007, highlighting the disputes about 
market and private property in China instead of resolving 
them. Private property accumulated in the reform years is 
attacked as being stolen from the state and the people.65 
Rapid wealth concentration has aroused popular animosity 
towards private entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, liberal 
economists continue to call  for further privatization and 
deregulation in the national economy with scant regard to 
specific situations. China has been moving in the direction of 
a market economy, but under the shadow cast by its 
collectivist past.  The disputes in the macro external 
environment have not only persisted on the ideological level,  
but also affected the specific decision-making processes of 
individuals and entities in managing the resources formerly 
controlled by the state.  
It  is fair to say that the story of the Dianpai  River 
exemplifies the transitional process of China’s political and 
legal system. The evolution of property arrangements over the 
river resources has paralleled the development of a market 
economy in China. The emergence of the property rights 
                                                            
6 4  The amendment says “legal ly  obtained private  property  o f  the 
ci t izens shal l  not  be vio lated.” See Article  13 of  XI AN  FA (2004).   
6 5  See  e .g . ,  Li  Nan,  Siyou Caichan Qingxi  Ruxian,  Caifu  Yuanzui  Youdai  
Qiuj ie  [Const i tu t ional  Protect ion of  Private  Property  and the Original  
Sin o f  Wealth] ,  XI N W E N  ZH O U K A N  [NE W S  WE E K L Y],  Jan.  5 ,  2004,  
avai lable  a t   ht tp : / /news.s ina.com.cn/c/2004-01-05/18172552266.shtml  






claims over the riverbank land in Y village in the mid-1990s 
accompanied the official recognition of the market economy. 
H’s successful exclusive use of the whole riverbank land in L 
village would not have been possible without the progress 
China had made in recognizing and protecting private 
property in the following years. It  was in 2004, the year when 
a constitutional amendment guaranteed the protection of 
private property, that Mr. H went to the village committee 
members and the pumping station to seek their de facto  
acknowledgement of his exclusive control over the riverbank 
land. In my interview with him, he demonstrated familiarity 
with and sensitivity to the changes in China’s external 
political legal environment.   
 
IV. WHITHER THE TRANSITIONAL COMMONS?  
A. The Crisis of the Transitional Commons  
Most writings on the commons implicitly define 
successful institutions as those that last over time, constrain 
users to safeguard the resource, and produce fair outcomes.66 
No such institutions exist to govern the transitional commons. 
As a result,  the tragedy of the commons occurs when the cost 
of exclusive use is too high. When the benefit  of exclusive 
use exceeds the cost,  property claims arise over the common 
resources. However, this equation by nature changes over 
time. The temporary nature of property arrangements is 
further strengthened by the uncertain political and legal 
environment in which commons is embedded. Moreover, the 
distribution of resources is decided by the power structure 
within the local community, thus fairness cannot be 
                                                            
6 6  Arun Agrawal ,  Common Resources and Inst i tu t ional Sustainabi l i ty ,  
in  TH E  DR A M A  OF  TH E  CO M M O N S 41,  44 (National  Research Counci l  ed. ,  






guaranteed. The crisis of the transitional commons can be 
illustrated through the Dianpai  River case.    
Due to the absence of any effective management, the 
quality of river water deteriorated seriously and the fish 
became almost extinct,  which was a classic tragedy of the 
commons. Contested claims exist  as to the riverbank land of 
L village. Mr. H maintained his exclusive control by his 
advantageous position in the local power structure. However, 
“the strongest,” in Rousseau’s oft-quoted phrase, “is never 
strong enough to be always the master.”67 In a community of 
any complexity, the power structure is always a dynamic and 
changing process.68 The unequal distribution of resources 
brought about by Mr. H’s exclusive use of the riverbank land 
of L village furthered the vulnerability of his property claim. 
The changing and unpredictable political and legal 
environment in China renders any property claims to the river 
resources uncertain, survive in the local community or not. 
For example, i t  is not inconceivable that one day the local 
government will  decide to protect state-ownership, and help 
the pumping station to recover its control over both 
riverbanks.69 In a sum, the transitional commons is in a state 
                                                            
6 7  JE A N-JAC Q U E S  RO US S E A U,  TH E  SO C I A L  CO N T R A C T  8  (1920).   
6 8  SA M U E L  P.  HU N T I N G T O N,  PO L I T I C A L  OR D ER  IN  CH A N G I N G  SO C I E T I E S  9  
(1968).    
6 9  The current  res torat ion of  s ta te-ownership in  coal ,  o i l ,  and s teel  
industr ies  can be a  footnote of  th is  possibi l i ty.  In  Shanxi ,  the province 
government shut  down al l  small  pr ivate  coal  mines in  the name of  
safety,  which were forced to merge in to  b ig s ta te-owned coal  mines .  
See  Xu Yiping,  Zheshang Shangshu Zhi  Shanxi  Meigai Weixian  
[Zhej iang Merchants  Pet i t ioned that  the Coal Industry  Reform in 
Shanxi  Was Unconst i tu t ional ] ,  avai lable  a t  
ht tp : / /news.163.com/09/1110/10/5NOJE8OA000120GR.html  ( last  
vis i ted August  13,  2011).  In  Shandong,  Shandong Steel ,  an  ineff icient  
company owned by the province government acquired Rizhao Steel ,  a  






of resource deterioration, unequal distribution and potential 
conflicts.        
Three ways have been proffered to avoid “the tragedy 
of the commons:” private property, public ownership, and as 
Ostrom showed, community governance. According to Ostrom, 
these three ways are alternatives to each other and one or the 
other should work out. It  is widely held that the general 
approach adopted in transitional countries is to choose the 
best way and impose it  nationwide from above. Unfortunately, 
none of the three ways are likely to overcome the crisis of the 
transitional commons. The reason is that transitional 
commons emerge because of the failure of state and the 
disintegration of local community. Whatever the property 
regime, no property rights can be defined and enforced 
effectively in this situation. In contrast,  I  propose (1) a 
decentralized way to deal with the transitional commons 
problem; and (2) an integrative approach to govern the 
transitional commons.   
                                                                                                                                                      
Pingshenme Neng Binggou Yingl i  Guoqi  [How Can An Inef f ic ient  S ta te-
Owned Enterprise Acquire A Prof i table  Private  Enterprise ] ,  avai lable 
a t  
ht tp : / /f inance. ifeng.com/topic/news/rzgt /news/opinion/cjpl /20090805/1
041412.shtml ( last  v is i ted August  13,  2011).  In  Shaanxi,  pr ivate  o i l  
companies were expropria ted  by the local  county government and 
private  entrepreneurs  were arrested  in  their  s truggle against  the 
expropr iat ion.  See  Shaanbei Shiyou Shi j ian  [Shaanbei Oil  Incident] ,  
ht tp : / /zh .wikipedia .org/wiki /%E9%99%95%E5%8C%97%E7%9F%B3%E
6%B2%B9%E4%BA%8B%E4%BB%B6 ( last  v is i ted August  13,  2011).  
For  a  comprehensive comment  on the trend of  the restorat ion of  s tate-
ownership ,  please see Xie Peng,  Guojin Mintui:  J idang 2009  [Surging 
2009: The State  Moved Forward and The People Drew Back] ,  






B. Community Differences and Institutional Diversity  
Each common resource system has its own distinctive 
features, either in the resource characteristics, the local 
community of exploiters, or the relationship between them. It  
is almost impossible for the state government to gain the 
local knowledge of various communities. The information 
cost is too high. What’s more, the distinctive features of local 
communities mean that no single solution, even if it  is the 
best institution theoretically, exists for the governance of all  
common resources. Community differences and institutional 
diversity have received wide recognition in scholarly 
discussions on the management of the commons, and they 
have been considered in many countries’ commons-related 
policy-making.70  However, the influence of conventional 
thinking is so powerful that i t is worthwhile to deepen and 
strengthen our understanding of community differences and 
institutional diversity through empirical studies.   
In the case of China, collectivization and marketization 
have impacted villages differently, as we have seen from the 
comparison between the two villages along the Dianpai  River.  
The community structure and micro-politics also differ from 
village to village, as a result  of varying factors such as 
tradition, custom, incidents, economic development, and 
population mobility, etc. Traditional and official authorities 
have declined to different degrees in different communities. 
Different degrees of coherence can exist,  even within the 
same area, as in my case study, which directly influences the 
ability of the villagers to self-govern.71 Various property 
claims to the transitional commons that arise depend on 
specific situations. There is no general rule as to which kind 
of property claims should be recognized or rejected. Private 
property may be easily accepted in one village while widely 
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resisted in another.72 This is not to mention the substantial 
differentiation between the south and the north, the west and 
the east,  in geographic, economic, political,  and almost all  
other aspects that influence the management of natural 
resources. In Ostrom’s words, the capacity of individuals to 
extricate themselves from various types of dilemma situations 
varies from situation to situation.73  
Chinese scholars have raised contested proposals to 
govern the rural common resources, which generally fall  into 
three categories: private, communal and government property. 
Privatization and governmental control are the two 
prescriptions easily recommended by scholars to manage the 
commons.74 The centralization advocates presume that a 
central authority must assume continuing responsibility to 
make unitary decisions for a particular resource.75 In the 
specific situation of rural China, this proposal requires the 
building of powerful grassroots governments in rural China to 
fil l  the void created by the decline of the traditional authority 
and custom and the post-communist retreat of the state.76 The 
privatization advocates presume that a central authority 
should parcel out ownership rights to the resource and then 
allow individuals to pursue their own self-interests within a 
set of well-defined property rights.77 As Ostrom commented, 
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both of these proposals accept as a central tenet that 
institutional change be externally imposed on the individuals 
affected.78 Even the supporters of communal property are no 
exception on this point. Instead of taking community 
distinction and institutional diversity seriously, they seek to 
justify the superiority of communal property on a theoretical 
and abstract level by arguing for its advantages in scale 
economy and risk-spreading.79   
These external resolutions suffer from several common 
limitations. The biggest one is that they assume a unified 
solution for all  common resources, be it  public control or 
privatization. However, instead of there being a single 
solution to a single problem, many solutions exist to cope 
with many different problems.80 Local diversities generally 
exist . Imposing a uniform solution incompatible with a 
specific situation would make its implementation very 
difficult and costly. The collapse of People’s Commune in 
rural China81 and the failure of developing countries in 
building private property regimes82 are evidence of the costs.  
In addition, imposing reform from above would inhibit  the 
development of self-governance of the local community. This 
has been demonstrated by the many failures of governing the 
commons. For example, Acheson found that top down 
management policies worked against developing effective 
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rules, which led to cheating, a “gold rush mentality” and 
overexploitation in the New England ground fishery.8 3   
Also, these external resolutions ignore the risk of hasty 
nationwide institutional reform. “Getting the institutions 
right” is a difficult,  t ime-consuming, conflict-invoking 
process.84 It  is a process that requires reliable information 
about time and place variables as well as a broad repertoire of 
culturally acceptable rules.85 These premises are not present.  
Different from the commons in a stable society, transitional 
commons are often in a rapid evolutionary process. General 
consensus about property arrangements over the commons has 
not emerged, which makes it  difficult to decide the proper 
property arrangements for them. Moreover, from the macro 
perspective, the political and legal system of transitional 
states is still  unsettled. Any institutional reform is 
“rebuilding the ship at sea.”86 It  would be much more prudent 
to wait for the results of local experiments of different 
property arrangements before replacing them with one 
theoretically workable resolution. New institutional 
arrangements do not work in the field as they do in abstract 
models unless the models are well  specified, empirically 
valid and the participants in a field setting understand how to 
make the new rules work.87 So, even if unified reform proved 
to be ultimately necessary, it  would be more prudent to do it  
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after the full development of local informal institutional 
arrangements.88  
In short,  because of community distinctions, no 
external uniformed resolution works for all  transitional 
commons. The effort to build an idealistic property institution 
nationwide cannot avoid the tragedy of the transitional 
commons at the local level. A decentralized approach, with 
respect for institutional diversity, is essential to overcome the 
crisis of the transitional commons.    
C. Governing the Transitional Commons: An Integrated 
Approach  
The top-down approach aside, one important question 
remains: how are the transitional commons to be governed 
from below? Three choices come naturally: State, Communal 
and Private property.89 Unfortunately in a country of weak 
government and disintegrated community, none are viable 
options.90 The choice of state property is a typical centralized 
approach, the limitation of which I have discussed in the 
previous part .  Moreover, in the situation of the transitional 
commons, the state is weak and struggling to support itself.  
Its symbolic existence in rural areas is not strong enough to 
sustain direct control over the local commons. The success of 
communal property relies on the existence of community, in 
which local norms of mutual trust and reciprocity help 
regulate members’ behaviors and manage the commons.91 In 
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rural China, traditional communities have collapsed under the 
attack of collectivization and later marketization. New 
communities have not developed. Peasant communities have 
disintegrated into atomized individuals, acting out the logic 
of collective action and competing with each other towards 
the tragedy of the commons. For private property, no credible 
authority or mechanism exists to define and enforce rights. 
Individuals may fall into endless conflicts with each other 
over the ownership and distribution of commons resources. In 
the absence of third-party control,  a group of isolated 
exploiters cannot establish any stable institutions, including 
private property.   
The successful management of the transitional 
commons requires more than choosing the right property 
institution. Whichever institution chosen, a capable state and 
a well-functioning community in the institutional 
infrastructure are necessary to support it .  The remaking of 
Leviathan in rural China does not mean the revival of Mao’s 
all-mighty government in rural China. Instead, I define a 
capable state as a state that can protect individual liberty of 
choices rather than making choices for the people. Neither is 
the reconstruction of a well-functioning community a return 
to the traditional peasant community. Such natural order has 
gone forever.92 A heterogeneous village of significant 
mobility needs more organized institutions than before.93 To 
achieve the objects of state-making and community 
reconstruction, we need (1) rule of law to respect and protect 
the development of “order without law” in rural China; (2) 
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building social capital through self-governance of villagers. 
Below I discuss in more detail this integrative approach.  
1.  Rule of Law for “Order without Law”  
The first  question is whether the state and law is 
necessary in developing local property arrangements. 
Ellickson found in California that norms instead of legal rules 
are the basic sources of entitlements.94 Voluntary order can 
be developed and work well in the absence of law. Scholars 
studying common resource management also favor local 
property arrangements.95 Their studies of local resource 
management provide many cases of successful local 
management of common-pool resources.96 In their view, the 
community is an integral and indispensable part in governing 
the common resources.97 Resource users often create by 
themselves institutional arrangements and management 
regimes that help them define the rights and govern the 
commons effectively.98 In contrast,  titles  promulgated by a 
centralized authority unaware of local conditions often make 
the situation worse than continued dependence on local-level 
common property rules.99 To these scholars, property rights 
without law are not only possible, but also necessary in some 
situations. On the other hand, many legal scholars believe 
that property rights are inseparable from law. As Bentham 
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said, “[p]roperty and law are born together,  and die together.  
Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, 
and property ceases.”100 Holmes and Sunstein call  a right a 
“child of law.”101 Posner takes “right” to mean “a claim or 
entitlement normally enforceable through courts or equivalent 
agencies.”102  
There are similar discussions in the Chinese 
scholarship on village governance. Some scholars are critical 
of the penetration of the state and the market into the rural 
society, and instead argue for the importance of traditional 
customs and local rules in village governance.103 Some of 
their studies rely on Ellickson’s “order without law” to 
criticize the effort of formal institution-building in rural 
society, but pay no attention to the limits of social norms.104 
In contrast,  other scholars argue that the decline of 
traditional authority and local rules is unavoidable in the 
modernization of the state.105 Rule of law and a formal 
property system should be established from above in the rural 
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society.106 They argue for either privatization of rural land or 
a strong presence of the state in rural society-- even 
nationalization of rural land.107 The newest amendment of the 
Organic Law of Villagers’ Committee reflects this view, 
which tries to strengthen the control of the state over the 
VCs.108 
Local property arrangements and formal institutions are 
not mutually exclusive. Local property arrangements based on 
the consensus of the governing community, of course, have 
their advantages over rules promulgated by a centralized 
government. This voluntary order, however, still  needs the 
recognition and endorsement of the state. As Ellickson’s 
research reveals, we should respect “the order without law,” 
while, at the same time, sticking to the critical role of law in 
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defining the basic structure of a society.109 In a state with the 
rule of law, self-governance of the local community is usually 
recognized by the formal system. The formal laws, including 
criminal,  constitutional, and many other laws, also guarantee 
the normal operation of the community self-governance by 
preventing and punishing violation of individual liberty and 
basic rules of a society. The state often leaves the choice of 
property arrangements over commons to relevant individuals 
and gives official recognition to it .  For example, the U.S. 
Supreme Court struck down a number of state attempts to 
regulate home behavior and the composition of co-occupant 
groups.110 Generally, the state does not interfere with local 
property arrangements, but instead provides acquiescent 
recognition to such arrangements. This type of state 
recognition promotes the predictability and stability of local 
property arrangements. The formal institutions are the 
foundation of the development of local rules. 
“Most organizations in all  societies function with the 
explicit  support of the state.”111 The calamity brought about 
by Mao’s all-mighty state has made any effort of state-
building in rural China dubious. But it  is necessary to remake 
Leviathan in rural China. As Walter Lippmann said, “there is 
no greater necessity for men who live in communities than 
that they be governed, self-governed if possible, well-
governed if they are fortunate, but in any event, governed.”112 
These words apply in a far greater extent to transitional 
countries, where the community is fragmented and where 
political institutions have little power.113   
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Rule of law for “order without law” is different from 
the Maoist comprehensive penetration into the countryside. It  
just means the uncertainty rooted in transitional commons 
should be eliminated through formal institutional solutions. 
The state should respect the local property arrangements, but 
should also provide official recognition to such arrangements, 
in order to rid them of their transitional nature. Governments 
are established to secure rights, including property rights.114 
The state cannot just pretend to overlook what is happening 
in the far countryside and comfort i tself by calling the 
anarchy “order without law.”115  
In the case of the transitional commons, local 
consensus on property arrangements has generally yet to be 
formed. Conflicting property rights claims to the transitional 
commons cannot co-exist  forever.  Yet it  does not mean that 
the state should make property arrangements for the local 
community, nor does it  mean that there is nothing for the 
state to do. The role of state is to guarantee the real self-
governance of the local community, through which local 
consensus on the property arrangements can be achieved in 
the long run. The role of the state and law in the self-
governance of the local community will be discussed in the 
following part.    
2. A Liberal Community: Building Social Capital through 
Self-Governance   
There are different proposals to address the 
disintegration of traditional community. One way is to revive 
tradition. But this atavistic notion could only succeed if 
history was reversed, modernization undone, and the level of 
human organization reduced to family and hamlet.116 
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Traditional Chinese villages were closed and homogeneous, 
within which power was broadly dispersed and members had 
continuing face-to-face interactions with one another, thus 
trust was developed and worked well,  conducive to 
cooperation.117  However, this pastoral life has gone forever. 
Both Mao’s collectivization and Deng’s marketization are 
part of the effort to modernize traditional rural China. 
Successful or not, the closed villages have been opened to the 
state and the outside world. Increasing mobility and 
heterogeneity of population have broken the close-knitness of 
traditional Chinese villages. The question is whether a 
community can be kept close-knit,  but not closed. A close-
knit community requires that (1) power is broadly dispersed; 
(2) members have continuing face-to-face interactions; and (3) 
members actively participate in the public affairs of the 
community. Are such requirements possible in an open 
community of significant mobility and heterogeneity? If yes, 
how can we realize such a possibility?  
The answer is simple: a liberal community of self-
governance. A liberal community is a voluntary association 
free from both external and internal coercion, which requires 
both the self-refraining and endorsement of the state power. 
Externally the supreme power of the state tends to encroach 
on the autonomy of the local community.118 To prevent 
external coercion requires the self-restriction of the state 
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through constitutional arrangements.119 This might be 
difficult ,  especially in an authoritarian state, but is necessary 
to make a community close-knit.  People participate actively 
in public affairs of the community only when they feel they 
are free to do so, and that their participation makes a 
difference. Otherwise, as Tocqueville commented on the 
democracy in New England townships, “without power and 
independence a town may contain good subjects, but i t  can 
have no active citizens.”120 Only when the community is 
independent and free will  members be incentivized to 
participate in its public affairs, a process that gives them the 
opportunity to have continuing face-to-face interactions.121 
Internal coercion comes from the heterogeneity of the 
community. Human beings are born to be unequal in physical 
and mental strength. This inequality can be greatly magnified 
by the market economy.122 A community member with 
significant social and economic advantages over others tends 
to coerce other people to his or her will.123 With “one person, 
one vote,” members of a liberal community are given equal 
rights in participation and decision-making, offsetting their 
physical, social or economic inequality. The state should also 
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make and enforce laws that protect individual liberty and 
safety from private coercion and guarantee each member’s 
free voting rights. Community-level democracy is a way to 
make sure that power is broadly dispersed in a heterogeneous 
community, with the purpose of making the community close-
knit.   
A liberal community is also a community with free exit,  
which is at the core of the idea of voluntary associations.124 
Free exit not only provides a way to escape from internal 
coercion, but also makes sure that “people who join are 
people who trust.”125 First-party control would be much more 
effective in a society that people can control their own 
membership.126 In this sense, free exit (and the accompanying 
horizontal mobility) would increase rather than decrease the 
social capital  of a liberal community. In contrast,  as we have 
seen in the case of Chinese traditional villages, mobility 
brought by the market economy greatly weakens the close-
knitness of a traditional close community. The reason is that 
in those communities, members rely on “particularized trust” 
to communicate with each other and to participate in public 
affairs.  “Particularized trust” means the type of trust that 
exists only between people who are close to each other; 
people outside the closed networks are viewed with 
suspicion.127 It  often takes a long time for an individual to 
develop his or her own closed network. Thus, it  is difficult  to 
sustain particularized trust in a community with great 
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horizontal mobility. But in a liberal community, the self-
governance mechanism is the source of trust and provides a 
credible platform for members to interact with each other. 
They learn to participate by participating on this platform, 
through which inter-personal trust can be developed.128  
In sum, self-governance can make an open community 
close-knit by promoting the broad disperse of power, by 
providing a credible mechanism for individual members to 
communicate with each other, and by transforming silent 
subjects to active citizens. People trust and participate 
because it  is a l iberal community.  
VC in rural China was designed to be an institution of 
self-governance by peasants, rather than a level in the 
governmental hierarchy.129 But at the same time, the party 
branch at the village level was granted power to “play the 
role of leading nucleus.”130 Through the top-down party 
system, the county and township governments can interfere 
with villagers’ self-governance, and most of the time, 
actually exercise effective control over village affairs, 
including the election of VC members. As a result,  the 
village-level self-governance organization, under the lead of 
the party branch, became a hand of the local government. 
Conflicts between villagers and VC members occurred 
frequently before the abolishment of agricultural tax, which 
had greatly jeopardized the stability of rural society.131 After 
2000, when the local government no longer needs VCs’ help 
with administrative affairs and tax-collecting, they 
disappeared from the public space of villages.132 Both 
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problems seem to be very different from each other, but 
actually share the same origin: the villagers’ committee is not 
a real self-governing institution. Due to the lack of 
legitimacy, it  cannot represent villagers in public affairs, 
coordinate collective action of villagers, or arbitrate their 
disputes. Instead, i t  often deteriorates into an instrument that 
the powerful villagers utilize to exploit  other members of the 
local community.133 The transitional commons emerge partly 
because no real self-governance mechanisms exist  to 
coordinate villagers’ behaviors. The VC did not succeed in 
changing the situation. The terrible financial situation of VC 
is just an indication of its inability to overcome the logic of 
collective action: because the VC does not really represent 
villagers, it  cannot make a credible promise that i ts money 
will be properly used for public purposes. As a result,  no 
villagers would take the risk and invest in i t .   
The real solution is to let villagers govern themselves 
and make a village a liberal community free of both external 
and internal coercion. This requires the reform of the current 
Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committee (OLVC).134 First,  
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the relationship between village-level party branch and VC 
should be changed. As a self-governance institution, VC 
should be the supreme power organ of the village and should 
not be subject to the lead of any other institutions. The 
village-level party branch may monitor,  but not lead the 
activities of VC.135 Second, the government (of township or 
any upper level) should refrain from intervening in internal 
affairs of a village, especially village elections. With the 
relationship between VC and village-level party branch being 
changed, the external coercion from the government can be 
greatly weakened.  
At the same time, the government should also enforce 
laws that prevent external and internal coercion in village 
affairs, especially in village elections.136 Elections have been 
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implemented in many Chinese villages and many problems 
arose, which leads some to argue that grassroots democracy 
might not work for Chinese peasants.137 Those problems 
originated either from the external coercion of the 
government, such as designating VC candidates and denying 
some dissenting villagers’ candidateship, or from internal 
coercion of influential individuals, who used their wealth or 
violence to disrupt villagers’ free voting.138 These problems 
do not disprove the utility of self-governance. Instead their 
existence calls for real self-governance of villagers under and 
protected by rule of law. The government should refrain from 
intervening in village self-governance and protect the free 
voting rights of villagers against private coercion.139   
To make a village a liberal community also requires 
free exit rights of villagers, which consist of freedom of 
movement and free alienation of real property in the village. 
The corresponding hukou  (household registration) system and 
property laws should be revised to grant villagers free exit  
rights.  As previously discussed in the Dianpai River case, 
many villagers work in big cities for more than ten months 
each year. Without rights to exit the villages and to become a 
legal resident of the cities where they work, they are 
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irresponsible stakeholders in both places, decreasing social 
capital and causing social problems, including the crisis of 
transitional commons discussed in this paper. Reform of 
property laws is necessary to realize villagers’ free exit  rights.  
This does not necessarily mean privatization and free 
alienation of rural land, but instead means letting the local 
community choose the property arrangements they like. In 
case that a communal property is chosen, villagers should at 
least be free to alienate their share in the communal property.    
A freely-elected villagers’ committee will play a 
central role in managing public affairs,  including governing 
the commons. A liberal community will  be able to provide a 
public forum for villagers to discuss with each other about 
the ownership and distribution of resources. Villagers will be 
able to make credible promises to each other under the 
institutional framework of the liberal community. Therefore 
they could find some way together to overcome the crisis of 
the transitional commons. In Y village, villagers might desire 
to consolidate, formalize and legalize their individual 
occupation of the plots on the riverbank. In L village, 
individual entrepreneurs could be encouraged and respected 
as far as they do not become a source of coercion to other 
members of the community. Mr. H’s might-based rights will  
not be recognized unless he can get his actual possession of 
the riverbank land accepted by other villagers, either by 
compensation to the community or investing in the 
improvement of the river ecological system. In both villages, 
VCs can provide a forum for villagers to discuss the rules and 
norms, and the cooperation between the two villages and the 
pumping station regarding the use of the river water resources. 
Expectably, a cooperative mechanism governing the use of 
the common resources may come out as a result  of increasing 
social capital .  
 
